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Abstract

The research paper is a study of the upsizing trend of containerships witnessed by the
international shipping industry during the past decades, aiming to unearth the
pushing factors and constraints of the trend from a systematic point of view and
putting forward recommendations for concerned parties.

The historical development of world containerships is briefly reviewed, and the
characteristics of present world container fleet are summarized, also the future
development of the upsizing trend of containerships is forecasted using data from
different sources.

The drivers that push the containerships becoming larger and larger, exampled by the
economics of scale and development of ship design and building, are examined,
while the constraints preventing the upsizing development of box carriers are
explained and illustrated as well, like the systematic diseconomy, safety concerns,
overcapacity, etc.

A SWOT analysis is carried out on the employment of large-sized containerships
from the point of shipowners.

Recommendations are put forward for interested

parties, such as shipowners, port operators, maritime administrations, international

iv

maritime community, and service providers, etc.

Distinctive recommendations for

the international maritime community are proposed, wishing appropriate actions be
taken to guide shipowners’ enthusiasm of purchasing and deploying large, even
Ultra-large containerships (ULCS), in pursuit of lower unit costs.

Keywords: upsizing; containership; drivers; constraints; economies of scale,
diseconomies of scale; recommendation
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Chapter 1 Introduction

With the world largest ships record being broken now and then, the large-sized trend
of world merchant ships, especially the containerships (also known as box carriers),
has been being discussed frequently for years with lots of forecasts and predictions.
Mainly, there are two opposite judgments as to the upsizing development.

One side

believes that the ships will become bigger and bigger with the development of world
seaborne trade and modern technology. Yet another side thinks the trend will come
to an end due to limits of routes and ports, as well as the law of diminishing returns.
However, most of the previous studies are limited to analysis of economical size
optimization or specific limiting factors from a microeconomic view.

The paper restudies the topic with a wider scope of view and discusses the drivers
and constraints of the trend by taking the transport system into account.

The

economies of scale are mathematically analysed by quoting data from different
sources, and the diseconomies of scale and diseconomies of the transport system are
theoretically explained.

Special attentions are given to the international and

national policies, as well as the safety concern like the weights of containers, the
emergency response capabilities.

The study is divided into six parts. Chapter 1 gives a brief introduction to the study,
and Chapter 2 reviews the evolution of containerships, summarizes the
characteristics of the container fleet and gives some predictions as other studies did.
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Various drivers that push the containerships becoming larger and larger are listed and
examined in Chapter 3, such as the economics of scale, development of world
seaborne trade and development of ship design and building technologies, etc.
Unlike other studies, the limiting factors that prevent the upsizing development of
box carriers are discussed in detail in Chapter 4, with special attention paid to the
risk of diseconomy of the transport system and the safety concerns.

Chapter 5

carries out a simple SWOT analysis on employing super-sized containerships for
shipowners, and gives recommendations for stakeholders.
concluded in the last chapter.
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The main findings are

Chapter 2 Evolution of World Containerships

2.1 Historical development of world containerships.
The container era in shipping industry began in April 1956, when the Ideal X carried
containers from Newark to Houston in its inaugural voyage.

Containerships were

welcomed by world shipping companies because of its advantages of high efficiency
of loading and unloading, less loss or damage of cargo and low operational cost
(Levinson, 2006, p.1).

World containerships, used to be divided into different

‘generations’ according to their designs, have undertaken several waves of
developments, each wave representing a historical building level of containerships,
but it is harder to classify containerships by generations with the rapid development
of shipbuilding technologies.
categories.

Nowadays they are often grouped based on size

For a rough guide, Figure 1 shows how containerships have evolved.
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Figure 1- Evolution of containerships (all dimensions are in meters.)
Source: Ashar and Rodrigue, 2012.
Early containerships and fully cellular containerships (FCC). The early
containerships like Ideal X were composed of modified bulk vessels or tankers that
could transport up to 1,000 TEUs.

These ships were carrying onboard cranes as

most port terminals were not equipped corresponding facilities to handle containers.
At the beginning of the 1970s, container began to be massively adopted and the
construction of the first FCC entirely dedicated for handling containers started.
FCCs offer the advantage of using the whole ship to stack containers with cranes
removed1 and more containers could be carried.

At the same time, specialized

container terminals were constructed around the world to cater for these FCCs.
(Rodrigue, Comtois & Slack, 2013).

1 Cranes remain today on some specialized containerships such as reefers.
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Panamax and Post-Panamax.

In the 1980s, the hull dimensions of the largest

containerships were limited by the length and breadth of the lock chambers of the
Panama Canal.

However, economies of scale rapidly pushed for the construction of

larger containerships.

The size limits of Panamax containerships were achieved in

1985 with a capacity of 4,500 TEU.

The ships exceeding limits of the lock

chambers are classified as Post Panamax.

In 1988, the APL C10 class

containerships were introduced, exceeding the 32.2 m width limit of the Panama
Canal for the first time (Rodrigue, Comtois & Slack, 2013).

The rapid growth of

global trade provided Post-Panamax ships with substantial amount of cargo enabling
them to be used profitably, and with the Panamax threshold being breached, ships’
capacities increased to 8,000 TEU.

New Panamax and Post New Panamax.

New Panamax refers to ships designed to

meet the new locks of the expanded Panama Canal expected to open in 2014, which
can confer capacity of about 13,500 TEU (Baltic and International Maritime Council,
2014, p.49).

Ships over the new dimension limits of the Panama Canal are

categorized as Post New Panamax containerships, such as the E class2 and Triple-E
class ships separately introduced by the Maersk in 2006 and 2013.

These ships are

bigger than the expanded Panama Canal specifications and can handle up to about
18,000 TEU (Rodrigue, Comtois & Slack, 2013).

There are also ship sizes classified as Suez-Max and Post Suez-Max sizes limited by
the dimension of the Suez Canal, and Malacca Max 3 and Post Malacca Max
constrained by the maximum permissible draft of the Malacca Strait (Xie, 2013).
From the evolution process of containerships, we can see that although with
2 Capacity ranges from 11,000 to 14,500 TEUs, such as the Emma Maersk.
3 A draught of 21 m is the maximum permissible draught through the Malacca Strait and the name
“Malacca-max” has therefore been used.
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constraints like the accommodating ability of Canals, containerships have broken the
limits once and again and evolved into more efficient and larger-sized carriers.

2.2 Characteristics of present world container fleet
After more than fifty years of development, containerships carry an estimated 52 per
cent of global seaborne trade in terms of value. Their share of the world fleet has
grown almost eightfold since 1980 (United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, 2013, p.38), as goods are increasingly containerized for international
transport, manifesting their own distinct characteristics.

2.2.1 Higher Average TEU Capacity (ATC).

The world container fleet has been

developing fast, with its ships growing both in number and size.

Figure 2 illustrates

the changes of ATC of world container fleet by year of delivery. From the curve,
we can see that the ATC has been continuously increasing since 1980 and accelerated
its increasing pace in 2008. Notably, the ATC of 2014 (8336.16TEU) is 17 times
bigger than that of 1980 (484.38TEU).

-6-

9000.00
8336.16

8000.00
7000.00
6000.00

6064.45
5243.05

5000.00

3605.34 3436.12
3219.91
3717.99
2932.04
2036.49

4000.00
3000.00
2000.00

2014

2012

2010

2008

2006

2004

2002

2000

1998

1996

1994

1992

1990

1988

1986

1984

1982

1980

1708.461749.50 1430.79
1809.82
1606.57
845.76
1000.00
1656.82
897.80
484.38
0.00

Figure 2 - World Container Fleet Average TEU Capacity by Year of Delivery,
1980-2014 (TEU).
Source: Compiled by the Author, data exported from CRS.

2.2.2 Large ships take bigger share.

According to Clarkson’s statistics, there were

only 5 Post-Panamax ships at the beginning of 1990 with 217,000 TEU capacities,
which took less than 0.4% by number and 13.2% by TEU capacity of the whole fleet.
Yet since then the Post-Panamax ships have been taking bigger and bigger share of
the fleet both by number and TEU capacity. By the start of 2014, there were up to
1181 large ships (Post-Panamax) with capacity of 9,263,500 TEUs, taking 23.1% by
number and 54.1% by TEU capacity. Table 1 gives the specific composition of
world container fleet at the start of given years.

-7-

Table 1 - World container fleet compositions at year start (1990-2014).
Type

Feeder

Handy

Panamax

Post-Panamax

Post-Panamax

Post-Panamax

Range

100-999TEU

1000-2999TEU

3000&Over

3000-7999TEU

8000-11999TEU

12000&Over

Start

No

1990

625

1991

000TEU

No

000TEU

No

000TEU

No

000TEU

293.8

578

1,036.40

83

287.4

5

21.7

636

300.8

622

1,112.10

95

332.1

5

1992

661

312.5

662

1,186.60

110

387.5

1993

680

326.8

700

1,247.20

126

1994

681

327.8

759

1,334.80

1995

714

344.9

831

1996

780

384.9

1997

842

1998

No

000TEU

No

000TEU

0

0

0

21.7

0

0

6

26.1

0

444.6

12

52.6

148

529.2

12

1,450.60

175

632.5

855

1,477.20

250

421.8

935

1,611.40

911

463.2

1,043

1999

980

503.5

2000

999

2001

Total Fleet
No

000TEU

0

1,291

1,639.40

0

0

1,358

1,766.70

0

0

0

1,439

1,912.70

0

0

0

0

1,518

2,071.30

52.6

0

0

0

0

1,600

2,244.40

15

65.9

0

0

0

0

1,735

2,493.90

904.1

32

150.5

0

0

0

0

1,917

2,916.70

275

999.5

53

271.8

0

0

0

0

2,105

3,304.50

1,809.90

311

1,142.00

71

370.6

2

17.8

0

0

2,338

3,803.50

1,128

1,963.30

345

1,282.40

84

447.8

6

51.8

0

0

2,543

4,248.80

516.5

1,169

2,044.60

352

1,313.00

94

504.4

10

85.9

0

0

2,624

4,464.40

1,021

531.9

1,231

2,159.50

377

1,421.60

124

676.6

14

121.4

0

0

2,767

4,911.00

2002

1,014

532.6

1,305

2,303.00

396

1,493.20

186

1,037.70

15

129.6

0

0

2,916

5,496.10

2003

1,020

542

1,352

2,402.30

440

1,678.80

226

1,279.90

19

165.1

0

0

3,057

6,068.20

2004

1,040

558.7

1,411

2,526.40

477

1,829.60

258

1,479.40

25

214.4

0

0

3,211

6,608.50

2005

1,074

584.7

1,461

2,634.00

518

2,016.10

292

1,681.30

40

338.9

0

0

3,385

7,255.00

2006

1,125

624.1

1,551

2,814.20

583

2,302.70

319

1,843.80

72

610.4

0

0

3,650

8,195.20

2007

1,184

672.2

1,681

3,067.40

645

2,565.00

356

2,075.40

131

1,120.70

3

47

4,000

9,547.40

2008

1,241

719.9

1,835

3,337.20

740

2,973.40

389

2,287.40

164

1,409.90

7

109

4,376

10,836.60

2009

1,281

756.9

1,977

3,592.60

832

3,364.90

426

2,524.30

213

1,853.30

9

138

4,738

12,230.20

2010

1,253

745.7

1,953

3,546.90

885

3,615.80

455

2,711.20

243

2,129.30

14

206

4,803

12,954.90

2011

1,234

741.3

1,974

3,588.70

956

3,937.10

490

2,918.70

281

2,471.80

39

544

4,974

14,201.60

2012

1,217

736.7

1,987

3,606.90

960

3,953.80

541

3,215.10

317

2,805.20

74

1,005

5,096

15,322.70

2013

1,182

719.1

1,929

3,476.80

948

3,928.70

579

3,415.00

352

3,118.70

117

1,574

5,107

16,232.70

2014

1,148

701.9

1,887

3,401.60

899

3,761.30

630

3,667.30

400

3,541.20

151

2,055

5,115

17,128.70

Source: CRS.

2.2.3 World largest ship’s record is renewed more frequently.

Before Regina

Maersk was delivered with a capacity of 6400 TEU 4 s in 1996, the largest
containership’s record kept almost at the same level for a long time, as shown in
4 Maersk Line uses maximum load capacity in terms of filled TEUs to label its ships instead of the standard
TEU capacity, which is always less than the standard nominal TEU capacity.
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Figure 3.

After 1996, the world largest containership’s record has been breached at

a faster pace.

For example, Emma Maersk was the biggest containership with

capacity of 14,500 TEU in 2006. Then, it became the 2nd largest when CMA CGM
Marco Polo was delivered in 2012 with capacity of 16,000TEU. Eight months later,
Maersk MC-Kinney Moller, the first Triple-E ship delivered in July 2013, took over
the biggest position with capacity of 18,000 TEU. Foreseeably, this title will be
taken in November 2014 by the new biggest 19,000 TEU containership5 of China
Shipping Container Lines (Hong Kong) Co. Ltd (Jallal, 2013).

Figure 3- The Largest Available Containership, 1970-2013 (in TEUs)
Source: people.hofstrs.edu

2.2.4 Large containerships occupy the Mainlanes.

It is estimated that, as shown in

Table 2, 62% of capacity on the Mainlane E-W route was provided by VLCSs
(8,000+ TEU vessels) , while 36% was provided by LCS of 3,000-7,999 TEU.
5 At first, China Shipping booked five ships with capacity of 18400 TEUs in 2013, but they upgraded the
booking to 19000 TEUs in early 2014.
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In

total, 98% was provided by large ships, especially the Far East-Europe route and
sequential route with 100% deployments.

Even for the Non-Mainlane E-W rout, 90%

of the shipping capacity was provided by LCSs and VLCSs, while the North-South
route employed LCSs and VLCSs for about 75% capacity.
Table 2 - Estimated Trade Route Deployment by Containership Type (by 1st quarter
2014)
Type

Feeder

Intermediate

LCS

VLCS

100-999TEU

1000-2999TEU

3000-7999TEU

8000+ TEU

Route

TOTAL

% of TEU

Mainlane E-W

0%

2%

36%

62%

100%

Transpacific

0%

2%

54%

44%

100%

Far East-Europe

0%

0%

9%

91%

100%

Transatlantic

0%

12%

87%

0%

100%

Sequential

0%

0%

65%

35%

100%

Non-Mainlane
E-W

1%

9%

75%

15%

North-South

1%

24%

57%

18%

100%

Intra-Regional

15%

58%

26%

0%

100%

Intra-Asia

14%

63%

23%

0%

100%

Intra-Europe

24%

52%

24%

0%

100%

Other

4%

52%

44%

0%

100%

Total

3%

17%

43%

36%

100%

100%

Source: CRS, MDS Transmodal Databank

2.2.5 Improved performance.

Firstly, ships’ speed, powering and propulsion are

greatly improved. The typical design speed in service for large containerships has
increased from 23.0 knots to 25.0 ~ 25.5 knots.

Concurrent with the growing size

and speed have been improvements in the design of low speed diesel engines and
propellers.

Secondly, better utilization of cargo space by increasing container

stowage under deck, hatch width and depth.

Thirdly, the improvements of

container securing systems permit more cargo to be stowed on deck, and the number

- 10 -

of tiers has increased from 4 to 10 (as shown in Figure 1). Through these changes
in vessel design, large containerships are able to perform more economically and
profitably (Mercator Transport Group, 2005, pp.13-14).

2.3 Forecast of the upsizing trend of containerships
Based on the review of the historical development and the summary of the present
characteristics of the world containerships, taking into the emerging of world largest
ships into account, the question is whether the containerships upsizing trend will
continue or it is reaching the boundary.

Here go the following predictions.

Firstly, the orderings of large-sized containerships will continue. This is highly
likely for two reasons: firstly, operators are already doing “trials” on ULCSs for
economy of scale, and for the time being this strategy seems successful.

There are

shipowners declared their intention to follow Maersk’s new standards of
containerships—the Triple-E class.

ULCSs are going to expand in size and number.

Secondly, the Panama Canal will be able to cater for ships with a beam of 49m, equal
to approx. 13,500 TEU.

So going forward, the rush to size up will continue.

According to the forecast of Clarkson, world container fleet will be composed with
fewer Panamax ships and the smaller ones both by number and TEU capacity, while
the larger ships including Post-Panamax of different ranges will take bigger shares at
double digit increasing rates (13.4% and 43.3%), as shown in Table 3.
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Table 3 - Containership Fleet & Forecast (2008-2016)
TEU Range

Feeder

Handy

Panamax

Post-Panamax

Post-Panamax

Post-Panamax

100-999TEU

1000-2999TEU

3000&Over

3000-7999TEU

8000-11999TEU

12000&Over

Total Fleet

Start

No

000TEU

No

000TEU

No

000TEU

No

000TEU

No

000TEU

No

000TEU

No

000TEU

2008

1241

719.9

1835

3337.2

740

2973.4

389

2287.4

164

1410.0

7

109.0

4376

10836.6

2009

1281

756.9

1977

3592.6

832

3364.9

426

2524.3

213

1853.0

9

138.0

4738

12230.2

2010

1253

745.7

1953

3546.9

885

3615.8

455

2711.2

243

2129.0

14

206.0

4803

12954.9

2011

1234

741.3

1974

3588.7

956

3937.1

490

2918.7

281

2472.0

39

544.0

4974

14201.6

2012

1217

736.7

1987

3606.9

960

3953.8

541

3215.0

317

2805.0

74

1005.0

5096

15322.7

2013

1182

719.1

1929

3476.8

948

3928.7

579

3415.0

352

3119.0

117

1574.0

5107

16232.7

2014

1148

701.9

1887

3401.6

899

3761.3

630

3667.3

400

3541.0

151

2055.0

5115

17128.7

2015(f)

685.5

3335.6

3556.5

3858

4027.4

2590

18053

2016(f)

667

3278.5

3412

4001.3

4627.7

3285

19271.5

5 Yr Trend

-2.1%

-1.8%

-2.8%

6.5%

13.4%

43.3%

6.3%

Source: CRS.

Secondly, the largest containership is approaching the limit again.

To build any size

of containership is not a problem for today’s technology, but the operational
conditions set the size borders.

Besides Panama Canal, there are many other limits,

such as the Suez Canal, Malacca Strait, etc.

One rule is that the increase of ships’

size leads to the shrinkage of callable ports.

Although the remarkable designs of

Maersk’s E and Triple-E class containerships successfully increase TEU capacity
without much increase of ship’s draught, the increased beams make them unable to
pass the expanded Panama Canal.

MOL estimates a Suezmax boxship would be

able to carry 20,000 TEU of containers, and the designs of "Malacca Max" class
could carry about 27,000-30,000 TEU (Rodrigue, Comtois & Slack, 2013), but there
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are operational limitations to deploy these gigantics, and the largest operational size
is likely to be achieved soon.

Thirdly, development of containerships’ sizes will continue regardless of the limiting
factors.

By reviewing the historical development of containerships, we can see that

for certain period of time there were always “limit sizes” of containerships, but these
“limit sizes” had been broken one by one.

Development of containerships’ sizes

and the corresponding constraints are in dialectical unity.

Constraints limit

containerships’ size from continuous growing, while new development will bypass
the old constraints, but confront new constraints again.
repeats.

Then the dialectical process

Therefore, development of ships’ sizes is doomed to happen irrespective of

all the constraints, which is just a matter of time.
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Chapter 3 Drivers of the Upsizing Trend of Containerships

After the 2nd World War, two main characteristics of international shipping are trends
of specialization and gigantism (Ma, 2013).

In 2011, Maersk Line signed contracts

with Korea Daewoo Shipbuilding for 20 Triple-E containerships to be delivered
during 2013 and 2015 (Wikipedia, 2014a), once again justified the trend of gigantism
or upsizing trend. The main factors driving this trend are discussed below.

3.1 Economies of Scale.
Economies of scale normally refer to the economic relationship between cost and
ship size.

Shipping is about moving cargos at sea, so the business focuses on the

unit cost.

The annual unit cost (cost per TEU) of a containership can be obtained by

the following formula (Stopford, 2009, p.223):
C=

······formula (1)

Where C is the annual cost per TEU; OC the annual operating cost; PM the periodic
maintenance per annum; VC the annual voyage costs; CHC the annual
cargo-handling costs; K the annual capital cost; TEU the nominal TEU capacity of a
ship.

The economies of scale can be explained by formula (1), as the operating,

voyage and capital costs do not increase in proportion to the deadweight of the vessel,
so using a bigger ship reduces the unit freight cost (Stopford, 2009, p.224).
According to Clarkson’s calculations under certain assumptions, as illustrated in
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Figure 4, the owner of a large ship has a substantial cost advantage compared with
owner of a smaller one.

The cost of $648 per TEU for a 1200 TEU vessel falls

sharply to $498 per TEU for a 2600 TEU vessel, and with the TEU capacity
increases the cost per TEU goes further downwards.

The cost of an 11,000 TEU

vessel ($360) is almost just half of the cost of the 1,200 TEU vessel ($648). The
economies of scale play the fundamental role in the upsizing trend of containerships.

Figure 4 - Containership cost per TEU transported.
Source: Martin Stopford. (2009). Maritime Economics (Chapter 13).

Data from

CRS, HSH Nordbanlk and Drewry Shipping Consultants.

3.2 Strong demand derived from growing world seaborne trade.
Thanks to the open market economic development policy, diminishing trade barriers,
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements and the development of transport (Ma,
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2013), world merchandise trade has been growing at rapider pace, as illustrated in
Figure 5.

World merchandise trade has more than tripled since 1990, and world

seaborne trade synchronously grew with world merchandise trade with almost 2.5
times increase compared to that of 1990.

The rapid growth of world seaborne trade

creates strong and sustainable demands for international shipping services.

By

sharply cutting costs and enhancing reliability, larger containerships, including
VLCSs and ULCSs, gain and consolidate their marketable proposition with
substantial amount of cargo waiting to be shipped.

Therefore, another key driver of

upsizing trend of containerships is the strong demand for shipping services.

Figure 5 - The OECD industrial production index and indices for world GDP,
merchandise trade and seaborne shipments (1975–2013), (1990 = 100)
Source: UNCTAD, WTO, and CRS.

3.3 Containerization of cargos.
The trend of containerization of cargos is a driver that might be easily neglected but
closely interrelated with the trend of upsizing of containerships.
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Actually,

containerization and upsizing ships are in mutual promotion relationships.
Although containerization was a completely new way of organizing transport
involving massive capital investment, it is a rational way of transporting goods with
advantages of almost no limit to commodities’ types, effective loading/unloading
operations, internationally standardized sizes, automated handling system and low
shipping costs6(Nakazawa, 2013, p.50). As Maritime Economics put it, by adopting
containerization the industry opened the floodgates for global commerce (Stopford,
2009, p.41), and it has also led to an increased demand for container transportation,
thus driving the upsizing trend of containerships.

3.4 Innovation of shipbuilding technologies.
The coming into being of large-sized containerships benefits a lot from the
innovations of shipbuilding technologies, especially innovations in ship design and
propulsion.

Firstly, new material and hull design technologies make larger

containerships’ hull strong enough to resist transvers and longitudinal bending forces
and moments, such as the use of high strength steel.

Secondly, the proportion of

ship’s principal dimensions has been further optimized both for capacity and cargo
handling efficiency. For example, the Triple-Es’ innovative separation of bridge
and engine room without losing visibility7 makes more room for ship’s container
accommodation ability (Maersk, 2012).

Thirdly, more powerful, efficient and

reliable propulsion systems are produced to meet the increasing thrust demands of
large-sized ships, as well as to reduce emission and cut fuel consumptions.
twin drive configuration of the Triple-E class ships is one good example.

The

Through

two engines driving two propellers, the Triple-Es are able to retain the efficiency
created by the slower two-stroke engines and greater pushing power provided by
6 Before containerization: shipping costs take 5~10% of the selling price, after: shipping costs take only around
1% of the selling price.
7 The SOLAS convention includes requirements for bridge visibility on such large ships.

- 17 -

their twin propellers (Wikipedia, 2014a).

3.5 Development of information technology
Nowadays, almost every aspect of people’s life is greatly influenced by the rapid
development of information technology.

The influences on upsizing trend of

containerships are mainly in two ways.

Firstly, developments of information

exchange and management systems have greatly supported the cargo handling
processes and facilitated the size merits of bigger containerships, which were
immensely productive---reducing cycle times by 40%, errors by 30% and saving $5
per document (Stopford, 2009, p.42).

Secondly, the operations of containerships

become more and more dependent on the information technology.

The systems for

handling containers have become so sophisticated that it is impossible to carry out
container handling operations if the systems break down and more value of the
shipping business is being squeezed out.

3.6 Stricter emission control requirements.
Under the emission control requirements of MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI,
containerships are required to meet related emission reduction targets.

Often larger

ships mean low emission rate, and this could be explained by the EEDI index and
Specific Tractive Force (P/WV) (Nakazawa, 2013, p.8). EEDI can be obtained by
the following simplified formula:
EEDI =

=

Engine Power×SFC×CF
DWT×Speed
×SF × F
DW ×

=

(gCO2/ton-mile)

P
DWT×V

×SFC×CF

······formula (2)

P is the power of main and auxiliary engines; SFC is specific fuel consumption; CF

- 18 -

conversion factor between fuel consumption and CO2 emission; DWT Deadweight
and V ship speed. By replacing DWT with W (sum of ship’s weight, fuel weight
and payloads), then EEDI can be expressed as:
EEDI=

P
W×V

×SFC×CF

······formula (3)

As SFC and CF are constants, so EEDI is decided by P/WV with direct proportion,
which means the lower the P/WV the better the EEDI.

Because the minimum

P/WV can be calculated by the following formula (Nakazawa, 2013, p.75)：
(P/WV)min= Cf

1

2g

∙

4.84

V2

1
∇3

1
ηP

······formula (4)

Where, Cf is the frictional coefficient, ηP the propulsive efficiency, ∇ displacement
of the ship.

From this formula, we can see that the minimum P/WV is determined

by ship’s speed V and ship’s displacement ∇. For certain speed V, the bigger the∇
the lower the P/WV.

According to formula (2), the EEDI will be better if the

displacement becomes bigger, namely the bigger ships can achieve lower EEDI (less
fuel consumption and CO2 emission).

For example, Maersk’s Triple-Es’ propulsion

system could cut CO2 emissions by 20% compared with the E-class ships and 50%
lower than the average level of the industry (Maersk Line, 2012).

Therefore,

employing larger ships is one important way to realize the emission control targets
for shipowners.

3.7 Pressure of commercial competition
Where there is profit, there is competition.

Fierce competitions exist within the

container shipping industry. Every shipowner wants to take the leading role by
providing better service and occupying bigger share of the supply market.

Ordering

large-sized containerships is an easy option to expand TEU capacity and market
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share.

For decades, Maersk has been the leader of the container shipping industry

with its super TEU capacity and world biggest containerships at different times,
which had even become the standards or benchmarks for other shipowners’s
newbuildings like the latest Triple-Es.

Owning super-sized ships is becoming label,

even advertisement, of powerful capacity within the industry, more and more
shipowners join the rush of booking bigger and bigger containerships.

3.8 Development of port facilities.
Nowadays, the customers are more and more sensitive to transport time.
Fortunately, the development in port facilities limits this risk to the minimum.
Although it is the ships’ upsizing trend leads the development of port facilities, the
upgrading of port facilities in return further promotes the development of upsizing of
ships. Advanced and high efficient ports, berths and terminal have been built over
the past decades around the world together with automated facilities, cranes, loading
and unloading controlling systems, which make larger ships possible to realize the
efficiency of operation.

Taking container cranes for example, in 1970 a port crane

would typically be capable of dealing with containers stacked 35m high, by 1995 this
reached 52m, then in 2002 went up to 58 meters. With the advent of Triple-Es,
cranes are able to deal with stacks of up to 69 m (Preparing the ports, 2013).
Figure 6 shows how container cranes have evolved in size over the years.

Not just

the span and reach have rapidly increased, but also the handling capacities, which
have increased from 15~18 boxs/hour to 28~32 boxs/hour with only one person for a
gantry crane (Nakazawa, 2013, p56).
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Figure 6- Evolution of Gantry Cranes
Source: worldslargestship.com.

3.9 Canal expansions
To ensure 100% containerships being able to pass, Suez Canal Authority had
completed its planned phase to increase the Canal permissible draft to 22.12m at
January 2010, and is running a project to increase the depth of western channels of
the Suez Canal from 14.6m to 15.8m in order to allow giant containerships to pass
through and reduce their total transit time (Suez Canal Authority, 2014).

Another

important driver is the expansion of the Panama Canal, a critical node in
international trade. The original locks of Panama Canal were once the limits for
world largest ships, constraining the upsizing trend. However, with the expansion
project launched in 2006 and to be completed in 2014, the passage capacity of
Panama Canal is going to be enlarged to around 13,500 TEUs by deepening (from
12.6m to 16.8~18.3m) and widening (from 33.5m to 54.9m) existing channels, as
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shown in Figure 7. The expansion of Canals will definitely influence the structure
and deployment of container fleet.

According to Drewry’s research, about half of

existing Panamax containerships with capacity of 4000-5000 TEU are very likely to
be demolished when the expansion project completed, as shipowners would
desperately rather deploy larger ships for lower cost advantage and result in
overcapacities of the Panamax ships.

Therefore, the upsizing trend of

containerships will be encouraged by the expansion project.

Figure 7 - Existing lock and new lock of the Panama Canal.
Source: WMU, MSEM 2013-2014, Maritime Economics and Logistics Handout.

3.10 Pricing fall of building ships.
Although pricing of building new ships is not the decisive factor for upsizing trend, it
plays an important role of stimuli.

From Figure 8, we can see that there has been

big fall in newbuilding prices since 2008. Compared with the prices when the
Triple-Es was signed in February 2011, about 20 percent had dropped when the latest
two followers---United Arab Shipping Co. (UASC) and China Shipping Group
booked the similar sized containerships in 2013. Maersk paid an average of $185m
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each for the Triple-Es, while China Shipping paid $136.6m apiece and UASC paid
about $150m because of different design features (Porter, 2013). Similar capacity
but at considerably cheaper prices, the fall of newbuilding prices encourage
shipowners to order larger ships in order to obtain a lower slot cost.

Figure 8 - Containership New Building Price Index

Source: CRS, Container Intelligence Quarterly (First Quarter 2014).
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Chapter 4 Constraints of containerships’ upsizing trend

As a coin with two sides, with the drives for the upsizing trend of containerships,
there are constraints limiting the trend as well.

The main constraints are discussed

below.

4.1 Diseconomies of scale.
The economies of scale are not a sure thing, as they are also constrained by other
laws, such as the law of diminishing return and marginal cost, which may lead to
diseconomies of scale.

Margin is a very important concept in economics, and the

diseconomies of scale can be explained from two aspects, namely the marginal return
and marginal cost.

Viewing from the return side, as shown in Figure 9, according

to the law of diminishing returns, increasing quantity of a variable factor with other
factors fixed, the marginal product (return) and the average product of the variable
factor firstly increase but eventually decrease.

Applying to the size changes of

containerships, with the increase of size (TEU capacity) the marginal return increase
at first, then the return reaches peak at certain size, be it 8000 TEU or 15000 TEU,
but over that size will lead to decrease of the marginal return and average return.
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Figure 9 - Law of Diminishing Return.
Source: WMU, MSEM 2013-2014, Maritime Economics and Logistics Handout.

While viewing from the cost side, the law of marginal cost plays the invisible hand.
Marginal cost is the change in the total cost that arises when the quantity produced
increases by one unit, or it is the cost of producing one more unit of a product.

It

decreases with the increase of production at first stage, when the production reaches
certain quantity, marginal cost reaches the lowest, then increases dramatically with
the increase of quantity of production, going through a “u” curve, see Figure 10.

Figure 10 - Marginal Cost Curve.
Source: Wikipedia, Marginal Cost.
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For containerships, with the increase of containers carried on a ship, the marginal
cost decreases at first.
cost reaches the lowest.
marginal cost.

When the total containers reach certain number, the marginal
Over that number, then more containers will lead to higher

This has been verified by the Drewry analysis in 2003, as shown in

Table 4. They found that the marginal cost of containerships with 10,000 TEU
capacities was the lowest under setting conditions.

However, the analysis jumped

too wide from 10,000TEU to 18,000TEU, which makes the conclusion less
persuasive.
Table 4 - Marginal Cost and Average Cost per TEU by Ship Size
Size

4000TEU

6000TEU

8000TEU

10000TEU

18000TEU

Costs
Marginal Cost

9980

9250

8750

7500

12600

11250

10583

10125

9600

10100

4500

6350

8100

9600

12120

Per TEU($)
Average Cost
Per TEU ($)

Ship Building
Cost (m$)

Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants Limited 2003.
Another analysis made by Drewry was focused on the operating costs of
containerships. The analysis was to find out the minimum operating costs per TEU
for different ship sizes.

The total annual operating costs per TEU fall from $2,301

for 4,000 TEU vessel to $1,950 for 6,000 TEU ship, and the 12,000TEU size is
found to be the most economical ship type ($1413), but there are no data above
12,000TEU for comparison.

The specific results are shown in Table 5.
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Table 5 - Annual Operating Costs per TEU by Ship Type ($)
Size

4000TEU

6000TEU

10000TEU

12000TEU

Factor

Quantity

Percent

Quantity

Percent

Quantity

Percent

Quantity

Percent

Crew

233

10.13%

133

6.82%

83

5.79%

83

5.87%

Insurance

200

8.69%

167

8.56%

183

12.77%

167

11.82%

Administration

34

1.48%

33

1.69%

33

2.30%

17

1.20%

Port Charges

500

21.73%

450

23.08%

300

20.94%

283

20.03%

M&R

217

9.43%

167

8.56%

100

6.98%

133

9.41%

Storage & Lub

50

2.17%

50

2.56%

17

1.19%

30

2.12%

Fuel

1067

46.37%

950

48.72%

717

50.03%

700

49.54%

Total

2301

100%

1950

100%

1433

100%

1413

100%

Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants Limited 2003.
Although Drewry’s results might be not so accurate, actually there are huge
differences among operation costs of same ship size on same routes for different
shipowners under different conditions (Xu, 2007, p5), yet they testified the functions
of the economic laws of margin.

The development of upsizing trend of

containerships is ruled by these laws.

4.2 Diseconomies of the transport system.
With the economies of scale of shipping, there are possibilities of diseconomies of
scale for the container transport system. The transportation of containers at sea is
just one part of the whole container transport chain.

Deploying ULCS ships could

lower the transport costs of containers at sea, but the cost at sea is just one third of
the whole transport costs (Xu, 2007, p.3), which means the ULCS ships have to
integrate with landside segment of the transport system in order to benefit from their
sizes. Unfortunately the landside transport costs will increase dramatically as the
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ships’ sizes become bigger and bigger, because more containers used to be shipped
directly from near port have to be transferred to hub port for shipment by truck or
train, which might be far away from the place of origin and take more transport costs.
So the saving of costs at sea might be offset by the increase of landside costs leading
to the increase of the total costs of the transport system. The diseconomy of the
transport system will get rid of the super-sized ships through market competitions
and limit the further development of the large-sized trend.

4.3 Intensive capital requirement.
Although the mega containerships could realize the economies of scale, they require
too much capital investment.

Besides their high building prices of hundreds of

millions dollars, the operation of ULCSs asks for large amount of money as well.
The Triple-Es are claimed as technological marvels for their new concept in hull
design and layout, but the marvels are too costly for most shipowners within the
industry. Each costs $190m for building with the underlying price $160m plus the
costs (Maersk likes to call it investment) for energy efficiency optimizing
innovations $30m (Jallal, 2013). At the same time, considering the widespread
practices of slow-steaming, there are no much difference in slot costs between VLCS
and ULCS (NYK, 2014).

Therefore, shipowners are likely to be constrained by the

huge investment of building ULCSs or even bigger ships.

4.4 Depressed market and high fuel costs
Shipping industry subjects to the market cycles, like all other industries.

A typical

shipping cycle usually includes four stages: trough, recovery, peak and collapse
(Stopford, 2009, p.98). This can be seen from the charter rates of containership as
shown in Figure 11. The Index was 47 in 2001--at the trough stage, then it went
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into the recovery state with charter rates rose. From 2004 to2007, the rates were at
peak stage with high index value, but in 2008 the collapse stage started with
precipitate fall of charter rates, and then another cycle began.

6-12 Month Timecharger Rates Index
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

163
116
94
47

114
91

59

59

47
32

42

42

47

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Figure 11 - Containership Charter Rates Index (1993=100)
Source: Compiled by the Author. Data based on Containership Charter Rates of
CRS, Container Intelligence Quarterly (First Quarter 2014).

The 2008 economic and financial crisis threw far-reaching negative impacts on the
world economy and trade, and the performance of international seaborne trade
remains vulnerable to downside risks.

Freight rates were suppressed by both the

depressed market and the oversupply of capacities (UNTAD, 2013, p.68).

At the

same time, bunker oil prices have been increased more than six times for 380cst
(from 98.8$/t to 619.9$/t) and five times for MDO (from 172.2$/t to 967.3$/t) since
1995, see Figure 12. The overall low freight rates, coupled with high bunker prices,
the result is that container shipping has entered an ear of meager profit, which
definitely will limit the urge for upscale ships.
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380cst

MD0

Average Bunker price ($/t)

1200.0
1000.0

935.5936.6

800.0
630.3

600.0

518.8
382.1

400.0
200.0 172.2
0.0

98.8

200.7
102.2

152.1
100.6

411.3

504.5

264.4 260.4
237.2
180.0
145.9

970.9

967.3

693.9

649.4
552.1
514.9 469.8

619.9

373.9

Year

Figure 12-Worldwide Average Bunker Price by Year.
Source: Compiled by the Author. Data based on the Worldwide Bunker Price Trends
of CRS, Container Intelligence Quarterly (First Quarter 2014).

4.5 Emergency response capability
According to the theory of risk management, bigger ship means bigger risk of
accident8.

Large containerships are less flexible both enroute and at berth, as they

have bigger inertia and larger blind zones for lookout, especially the awkward layers
of containers loaded onboard.

On August 5th 2012, a leakage of containerized

dangerous goods happened on board Maersk Kuantan in Yantian International
Container Terminal.

Even though the leakage was harmlessly treated in the end, the

accident aroused the awareness of the emergency response to bigger containerships.
During the dealing process of the accident, the onsite officers could see clearly which
container was leaking, but it was very hard to stop the leakage due to the high layers

8 Risk= Probability * Consequence, bigger ships will lead to massive consequence once accident happened, so
bigger ships mean bigger risk.
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and stacks of containers (Xie, 2013).

Except for Maersk Kuantan, there are other

accidents, like the container fire on the Eugen Maersk and flooding of Emma Maersk,
which are found harder to respond effectively to the emergency situations.
Shipowners come to realize the fact that the bigger the ship the harder and less
effective to respond in emergency, and this in a way will prevent the trend of
employing larger ships.

4.6 Issue of Container weight
The advantage of container is safe, standardized and high efficient of loading and
unloading, but one big issue is the containers are not accurately weighed, which
affects the stability of container stacks and containerships.

Shippers tend to

understate the weight of their containers to reduce freight charges.

Not clearly

knowing the cargo weighs can lead to serious damage to ships.

Discrepancy

between declared weights and actual weights might be the reason for the crack and
sinking of the five-year old Post-Panamax 8,110TEU containership MOL Comfort in
June 2013.

Also the Maritime Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) in the UK

found that 20% of the containers being analyzed were more than 3 tonnes different
from their declared weights (Baumler, 2013).

Moreover, on larger ships, the

amount of containers carried increases uncertainty levels and may seriously affect
ships’ stabilities, so the issue of weight prevents ships’ sizes from unlimited
development.

4.7 Accommodating capability of port.
Ports are vital components of transport system and provide a crucial interface
between land and sea.

Maersk is loading around 15,000 -16,000TEU on

its Triple-Es instead of the full capacity---18,270TEU, largely because so far only
two ports in the world can fully accommodate them, namely Yantian and Tanjung
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Pelepas (Lin, 2014a).

The accommodating capability of port bottlenecks the

operation of large ships.

4.7.1 Limitation by water depth.

The depth of the approach channels and berths

of ports is the main constraint for larger containerships. Generally, the larger the
containership the deeper draught when fully loaded, and higher requirements for the
water depth of channels and berths.

The design draught of the ships in operation

with capacities over 80,000 TEU is normally 14.5m, and the depth for port’s
channels and berths should be no less than 15m for safe navigation and
berthing/unberthing.

However, there are only a few ports with enough water depth,

such as Rotterdam and Singapore (Liu & Chen, 2005, p58). Another concern is the
decreasing Under Keel Clearance (UKC).
more UKC has been eaten up.
Moreton Bay.

With the increasing ship size, more and

Figure 13 shows the changes of UKC observed in

In some parts there is now less than 1m clearance left, and ships are

at high risk of grounding and other accidents due to worse maneuverability without
enough water depth.

In Hong Kong, 10% UKC must be maintained throughout the

entire berthing/unberthing operation to ensure safe navigation (HKMD, 2012, p7).
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Figure 13- Changes of UKC in Moreton Bay.
Source: brisbanepilots.com.au.

4.7.2 Limitation by handling capability.

The economies of scale of bigger ships

closely relate with cargo handling capability of ports, which largely decide the
port-calling time.

Limited by the handling capacities in most ports, bigger ships

have to spend longer time in ports for loading and uploading operations in addition to
waiting time, which greatly impacts the economies of scale due to the increase of
operating costs for longer port-calling time (Xu, 2007, p3).

This is way the

Hub—Spoke model is adopted in operation, which could save port-calling time by
reducing direct-calls.

Even so, bigger containerships still will lose their advantage

in cutting operating costs without high efficient handling capacity.

However,

upgrading facilities to increase handling efficiency is an easy but expensive option.
For example, to receive the Triple-Es, eight high efficient but costly portainers with
out-reach span of 23 rows of standardized container should be equipped (Maersk
Line, 2012).
4.7.3 Limitation by collection and distribution (C&D) capability.

Not isolated

islands at sea, large containerships have to link with other segments of the transport
system---the port operations and inland transport system to realize the systematic
economies of scale.

The C&D capability of port includes storage, collection and

distribution of inbound and outbound containers.

Also railways, roads and inland

waterways converge on ports, all these transport segments must be linked and
managed efficiently (Stopford, 2009, p.81).

With large-sized ships carrying large

amount of containers, the C&D capability of port is seriously challenged.

For ports

with biggest container throughput like Shanghai and Yantian, the C&D of containers
heavily rely on the road transportation, which are often jammed with trucks queening
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in line waiting for picking up or delivering containers.

Yet the improvement of

C&D capability means port modification and transport system transformation, which
takes years and huge investment.

The desynchronized C&D capability of ports will

greatly affect the operation of large containerships for delay delivery of customer’s
cargo (Xu, 2007, p4), thus limiting the further development of containerships’
large-sized trend.

4.7.4 Limitation by third party services.

Except for the port facilities and

capabilities, there are limitations from third party services, such as tugs, pilots and
forwarders, etc.

Take tug service for example, the towing power of tug is

challenged by ULCSs with their side windage area larger than 10,000m2 and it
becomes harder to tie and tow cables as the higher freeboards of ULCSs (Yang, 2011,
p.10). Although some ports are trying new tugs, such as the Robert tugs (designed
by Robert Allan LTD of Canada) in Ningbo Port, their adaptation to the large
containerships is still to be verified.

Without synchronized development of the third

party services, the efficiency of the larger containerships will be lowered and the
costs of operation will increase greatly (Zheng & Lin, 2005, p.79-80).
4.8 Limitation by shipping routes.
Routes are one of the major factors limiting the upsizing trend of containerships, as
their permissible dimensions decide the maximum size of containerships operating
along them. Among the international routes, the main constraints are the water
depths and widths of the Suez Canal, Panama Canal and Malacca Strait, as they are
located at the forts of the shortest international routes.

Large-sized ships exceeding

the permissible max sizes can only operate in limited routes or detour.

If the cargo

flow changes, then the large ships will be seriously impacted for their limitation to
routes.

As illustrated in Table 6, 84% TEU in the Mainlane E-W is provided by the
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VLCSs, 61% of which are operated in the Far east-Europe route, which are sufficient
in depth and long in distance, giving enough places for VLCSs’ economies of scale.
Table 6- Estimated Containership Type Deployment by Route
Type

Feeder

Intermediate

LCS

VLCS

100-999TEU

1000-2999TEU

3000-7999TEU

8000+ TEU

Route

TOTAL

% of TEU

Mainlane E-W

0%

5%

41%

84%

49%

Transpacific

0%

1%

19%

18%

15%

Far East-Europe

0%

0%

5%

61%

24%

Transatlantic

0%

3%

10%

0%

5%

Sequential

0%

0%

7%

5%

5%

Non-Mainlane
E-W

2%

5%

17%

4%

North-South

10%

33%

31%

12%

24%

Intra-Regional

87%

57%

10%

0%

17%

Intra-Asia

45%

34%

5%

0%

9%

Intra-Europe

39%

15%

3%

0%

5%

Other

4%

8%

3%

0%

3%

Total

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

8%

Source: CRS, MDS Transmodal Databank.
4.9 Pressure of overcapacity.
The economic crisis in 2008 resulted in the reduction of demand for container
transport, leaving the shipping market with surplus capacity.

Ordering larger

ships is one of the simplest and most straightforward ways to lower slot costs but
creating a vicious circle of recurring overcapacity, because every shipowner is trying
his best to manage costs, eventually shipowners are building larger ships leading to
another round of overcapacity.

According to statistics in early 2013, containerships,

among the different vessel types, had the highest utilization rate--99.85% (UNCTAD,
2013, p.64). However, the high utilization rate hides the real oversupply as the data
excluded the idle capacities.

If idle capacities are considered, only about 95 to 96
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percent of the fleet was in service (Clarkson Research Services, 2013, p.103).

In

addition, slow steaming has helped to absorb an additional capacity of about 1.7
million TEU, equivalent to more than 10% of the existing fleet.

The overcapacity

of containerships leads to low freight rates and fierce competition, and shipowners
might be at loss or just earn meager profit, thus constraining the upsizing trend.

4.10 Administrative policies.
On one hand, international maritime instruments might be constraints of the upsizing
trend. Under the requirements of SOLAS Chapter VII and the relevant provisions
of the IMDG Code, the illustrations of segregation for containers containing
dangerous goods onboard containerships was approved by the Maritime Safety
Committee (MSC) in May 2012, which might incur longer time for stowage plan of
containerships and rising of operating costs. More importantly, MSC approved in
May 2014, for adoption at MSC 94 in November 2014, draft amendments to SOLAS
Chapter VI to require mandatory verification of the gross mass of containers (IMO,
2014), which will definitely impact the operations of containerships in a far-reaching
way.

The mandatory requirements aim to promote the safety of containerships, but

maybe at the expense of higher operation costs for shipowners as the time at port will
be prolonged for weights verification.
On the other hand, national rules could limit the ships from growing bigger, though
not intentionally. Take Chinese sea ports policies for example, according to MOT’s
statistics, there were almost one third of the berths across China receiving ships of
over-approved berthing sizes (Li, 2006).

The first Triple-E--Maersk MC-Kinney

Moller had to visit Yangshan, Zhoushan, and Yantian in her maiden voyage with
reduced load, because these terminals had not been officially verified with capability
of accommodating containerships of that large size (Chen &Wang, 2011, pp.24-29).
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In January 2014, MOT issued the Rules on the Berthing Capacity of Coastal Ports,
aiming to exert berth's potentials of Chinese coastal ports by permitting upgrading
one or two berthing classes provided safety guaranteed to meet port production
requests for receiving larger ships (MOT, 2014), but still the maximum approved
sizes of ports by national policies ceil calling ship’s sizes.

4.11 Limitation by cargo canvassing capability.
Larger containerships bring ports with massive surge of containers discharged in one
call and the challenge of filling them with cargo on a regular basis.

The economies

of scale of large-sized containerships could only be achieved under conditions, one
of the conditions is the high utilization rate, in other words--sufficient cargo to be
shipped.

Once there is broken stowage, the merits of large-sized containerships will

be discounted.

The more broken stowage the less merits, and the demerits of

large-sized ships increase.

There are lessons to be drawn from the development of

oil tankers, which once pioneered the upsizing trend in the world shipping industry.
Since 1966, oil tankers had enjoyed a very rapid upsizing evolution from VLCC up
to ULCC, even super ULCC. However, with the oil crisis and limitation of world
crude oil production, the ULCCs and VLCCs exceeding 300,000 tonnes were
gradually laid up or used for other purposes, not to mention super ULCC (Li & Wang,
2002, pp.34-35). For containerships, according to the schedule of Daily Maersk,
the capacity of every ship in service is bigger than 10,000 TEU, without powerful
cargo canvassing capability, it is impossible to run the route profitably.

If they

cannot run these bigger ships profitably due to insufficient cargo, then smaller ships
will squeeze in and replace them. Therefore, the upsizing trend of containerships is
also constrained by the cargo canvassing capability of shipowners.
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Chapter 5 SWOT Analysis and Recommendations

5.1 SWOT Analysis on employing large-sized containerships for shipowners
The SWOT analysis is used to find suitable strategy and strategic approach for
certain organization based on analysis of the four aspects of the internal and external
environment, namely opportunities, threats, strengths and weaknesses (Wikipedia,
2014b).

This method was originally developed for business and industry to identify

the positives and negatives of a choice or decision, and a SWOT analysis can be
done in many perspectives, but to simplify the situation, the SWOT Analysis is
carried out from shipowners’ perspective, as shown in Table 7.

Of course, SWOT

is not the only assessment technique available, with other optional tools such as the
Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) and Comparative Analysis, but it is a simple yet
comprehensive way of assessing the positive and negative forces within and without
a system.
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Table 7 - SWOT analysis on the employment of large-sized ships for shipowners.
Internal
Strengths

External
Weaknesses

Opportunities

Threats

1. Economies of scale with

1. Intensive capital investment.

1. Growing world seaborne trade and

1. Low accommodating capacity in

lower unit costs.

2. Risk of overcapacity and low utilization

container trade.

most ports.

2. High fuel efficiency.

rate.

2. Advanced shipbuilding

2. Persistent overcapacity in supply

3. Less emission per unit.

3. Higher requirements for cargo

technologies.

market.

4. Lower freight charges

canvassing.

3. Containerization of cargos.

3. Depressed freight market and

and more competitiveness.

4. Less route flexibility.

4. Development of information

rising fuel prices

5. Label of a powerful

5. Risk of longer transportation time.

technology and management systems.

4. Stricter safety requirements in

capacity and advertisement.

6. Higher requirements for service level of

5. Welcomed by port authorities and

navigation, operation and cargo

6. Bigger TEU capacity.

other sectors.

local administration as a driver of

handling by national and

7. Less effective in emergency response.

local economy.

international authorities.

8. Risk of bigger accident.

6. Development of exclusive container

5. Port operators tend to share, even

9. More port charges per ship.

terminals and facilities.

transfer, risks of investment in

10. Risk of diseconomies of scale

7. Expansion of Canals

upgrading facilities.

11. Possibility of involving in port facilities

8. Pricing fall of newbuildings.

6. Risk of changes of cargo flow in

upgrading or other similar investments.

9. Fierce competition for hub port

international trade.

among port operators.

7. Customers’ increasing sensitivity
of time

Source: compiled by the author.
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The SWOT analysis just offers perspectives of employing large containerships for
shipowners.

Decision-makers cannot make strategic plans simply based on the

comparison of numbers of strengths and weaknesses or opportunities and threats,
because the weight of each strength or weakness is different for different shipowners
according to their own conditions.

Actually, only the strength of economies of scale

of larger containerships is attractive enough for shipowners.

However, as SWOT

usually reflects just the current position or situation, it might shield new possibilities.
So decision-makers should be open to the possibilities that exist within a weakness or
threat as well as recognizing that an opportunity can become a threat if everyone else
sees the opportunity and plans to take advantage of it, so the economics of scale of
large containerships may become threat as every shipowner want to take advantage
of it and lead to serious overcapacity.

5.2 Recommendations for stakeholders.
Based on the drivers and constraints analysis as well as the SWOT analysis, the
following gives some recommendations for the main stakeholders under the upsizing
trend of containerships.

5.2.1 For shipowners.
Shipowners 9 play the leading role in the upsizing trend of containerships, as
bigger-sized ships are deemed to be cost savings through economies of scale.
However, the economies of scale could only be achieved under conditions, so
shipowners should respond to the upsizing trend based on their individual situations,
rather than following others in a rush. The recommendations are mainly given in
six aspects.

9 Shipowners here include ship operators.
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Firstly, take advantages of mega containerships and optimize capacity network.
Modern larger ships are better designed with economies of scale and fuel efficiency,
smaller and older designs will gradually be replaced. However, considering the law
of marginal cost and diminishing return, it is not the larger the better.

The

optimized ship size for different owners may differ greatly, as it is decided by
individual slot costs (Liu & Chen, 2005, pp.57).

The best policy is to take the

advantages of the mega ships in cutting costs and control the upsizing trend at a
reasonable pace taking other constraints into account.

At the same time, optimizing

operation network is a relatively cheap choice for costs cutting and profits earning.
Under present market, most shipowners are still suffering from losses in the
container sector. Although the newbuilding prices have fallen about 40% since
2008(see Chapter 3, 3.10), ships are still awfully expensive to purchase.

One

typical example is Maersk Line, which has sought to optimize networks and vessel
speed to cut costs by carrying out a company-wide retrofit program since 2012 and
also has not placed any new orders after the Triple-Es (Lin, 2014b).

Secondly, integrate shoreside segments of the transport system.

In recent years,

more and more VLCSs have been deployed into operation by the major liners,
wishing to obtain a lower operational cost per TEU. Yet the economies of scale of
mega containerships at sea will be largely discounted by the inefficiency or
mismatching segments on shore, such as the port C&D segment and inland transport
segment, etc., as the time at berth will be greatly prolonged.

However, the

inefficiency of segments onshore takes both time and money to improve.

Although

it is a tough task involving different parties, shipowners should try to integrate
shoreside segments of the container conveying chain to achieve the overall efficiency
and economies of scale.
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Thirdly, cooperating with other owners.

With the development of upsizing trend

of containerships, cooperation among shipowners is strengthened by economic
motives, such as higher market coverage and service frequency, powerful marketing
capability, improved freight stabilisation, higher vessel space utilization and better
cost control (Ma, 2013).

One prevailing way of cooperation is strategic alliance.

Before June 2014, there are mainly three international strategic alliances formed by
major liners dominating international container shipping market--the P3, G6 and
CKYH. P3 Alliance, formed by top-three players combined provides 56% of the
services on the Asia-North Europe trade lane.

The G6 Alliance offers a nominal

55,000TEU average weekly capacity, while the CKYH Alliance with Evergreen
joining (CKYHE Alliance) offers 43,000TEU (Bennett, 2014).

However, the

alliances might lead to monopoly, as other ships of shipowners out of the Alliances
will be squeezed out. That’s why the P3 Alliance was killed by China’s Ministry of
Commerce on June 17th 2014.

Nevertheless, cooperating with other owners is a

good way to efficiently operate large containerships.

Fourthly, enhance marketing and cargo-canvassing capacity.
more containers, and need more supply of goods.

Larger ships carry

Shipowners today not only have

to compete with others for ships efficiency, but also the canvassing capacity for
goods.

At the same time, with the increasing TEU capacities of ships, the

imbalance of containers between two ways in one route will be aggravated due to
imbalance of cargo flows (Xu, 2007, p5). Therefore, shipowners should enhance
their marketing capacity and explore more steady cargo supplies, especially the
backhaul cargos, to adapt to the increase in shipping capacity.
Fifthly, adopt differential competition strategy and pay attention to feeder
services.

The bigger ships become the less flexibility in operation.
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When the

attention of global shipowners is caught by the mega containerships, one of Lloyd’s
List’s experts pointed that there were big chances for the feeders (middle and small
size ships). The reason is that with the deployment of VLCSs and ULCSs only
fewer ports will be chosen as direct-calls in order to cut the time in ports, thus
forming a new structure of ports of call--the hub ports (direct-calls) and the spoke
ports (the feeder ports).

As the number of hub ports decreases, there are more

spoke ports leading to more demand for feeder services. Therefore, shipowners
could differentiate their strategies according individual conditions, and feeder
services might be a good chance.
Sixthly, adapt to policy changes.

Although shipping is an open and free

competition market, the impacts of the visible hand cannot be ignored.
International instruments and national regulations concerning containers or
containerships might be very influential, such as the requirements for emission
control, segregation of containers containing dangerous goods and verification of
containers’ weights by IMO. Shipowners have to develop and adjust strategies to
adapt to and fulfill the new requirements of policy changes, though sometimes
adapting to the policies means costs and inefficiency.

5.2.2 For port operators
Firstly, improve accommodating capacity and service efficiency.

Investments in

ports will lead to increases in efficiency and lower transport costs by enabling goods
to get to and from markets in a more timely and cost-effective manner.

As

forecasted in Chapter 2, the upsizing trend of containerships will continue. So the
average sizes of ships received in ports will become bigger and bigger.

In order to

adapt to the upsizing ships, which require higher cargo handling efficiency and
deeper water both en route and at berth, port operators should take measures to
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improve the accommodating capacity and service efficiency.

Measures should

include but not limit to upgrading infrastructure, optimizing facilities configuration,
dredging nearby water ways, adopting more advanced and automatized cargo
handling systems, etc.

Secondly, cooperate with shipowners.

As shipowners chose the ports of call for

their ships, the development of ports is decided by the strategies of shipowners.
However, ports are capital intensive investment, yet their fates are in the hands of
shipowners, thus the best policy is to cooperate with shipowners in building and
operating of ports. Moreover, cooperating with shipowners in ports (or terminals
/berths) is a win-win strategy for both port operators and shipowners.

It alleviates

the capital pressure of investment and ensures steady port charges 10 for port
operators with frequent calls of ships, and it also benefits shipowners by providing
more suitable and efficient port services for their ships, which can minimize their
ships’ time in ports and ensure higher level services for shippers.

Thirdly, avoid over investment and vicious competition.

Ports are generally

considered to be a long-term and capital intensive investment offering steady returns.
With the polarizing process of Hub ports and Spoke ports caused by the deployment
of larger ships, no ports used to be direct-calls want to be degraded as feeder ports
(Xu, 2013, p192), thus port operators are very likely to rush into the tide of pouring
money in ports to attract shipowners’ attention, which will definitely lead to over
investment that cannot be recovered and fierce inter-port competitions, even vicious
competitions without proper coordination (Peng, 2002, p.9).

Therefore, port

10 Ports earn income by charging ships for the use of their facilities, and shipowner may be charged in two ways,
an ‘all-in’ rate where everything is included; or an ‘add-on’ rate where shipowner pays a basic charge to which
extras are added for the various services used by the ship during its visit to the port.
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operators should objectively position their ports in the new Hub-Spoke network of
world container shipping--whether it is hub or spoke, and take appropriate strategies
accordingly, instead of simply catering for the VLCSs or ULCSs. One failure
example is the Dachan Bay Container Terminal (DCBCT) in western Shenzhen, with
all the advanced facilities the DCBCT was designed to work as a hub, unfortunately,
competed with Nansha, Chiwan and Shekou container terminals, it resulted in a
feeder with huge investment hard to recover.

Fourthly, abide by requirements concerning safety operations.

Port operators

also face the challenges of safety operations regulated by national rules or
international instruments.

One example is the berthing capacity of ports, as

mentioned in Chapter 4. Different nations have different requirements, as some
take safety as the paramount factor, while others give priority to economic growth.
So operators should abide by these regulations and take measures to implement
related safe operation requirements, such as providing relevant space and facilities
for the new requirements of verification of containers’ weights.

Nevertheless,

safety is an important factor for the proper operation of ports, investment in safety
takes great amount of money, but ignoring safety will cost even greater.

5.2.3 For national administrations
Firstly, guide the development of upsizing trend of ships by policies.

With

larger ships comes greater risk, such as risk of safety navigation and operation.
Although the upsizing trend of ships is the result of free market competition, the risk
and negative impacts should be controlled and minimized for public interests. So
maritime administrations should guide the upsizing trend and limit possible negative
impacts by publishing related policies.

As to large-sized containerships, more

exclusively specific safety requirements or standards should be made, such as the
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standards for ship’s hull strength, requirements for safety navigation and making
stowage plan, requirements for extra equipment or facilities carrying onboard for
emergency response, etc.

As to ports, new regulations should be made to guide the

development of ports catering for the upsizing trend of ships, such as the standards
for verification of berthing capacities11 and requirements for safety operations in
port. Also, administrations should provide policy supports to shipowners and port
operators in financing, as both purchasing large ships and building ports are capital
intensive and long-term recovering, favorable financing policies will help
shipowners and port operators to endure market risks.

Secondly, optimize layout of ports.

As the interface of ship and shore in

transportation system, ports sustain the development of national economy and
foreign trade. Also the development of ports will bring taxes, job opportunities and
flourishing of local economy.

However, under the impacts of upsizing ships, ports

might spend tremendous money in infrastructure improvement in order to meet the
requirements of large-sized ships resulting in over investment and vicious inter-port
competitions.

Administrations should coordinate and optimize the regional layout

of ports (hub ports and feeder ports) through macroscopic readjustment and control
to avoid vicious competitions among regional ports.

Especially, maritime

administrations should be prudent in making plans for exploring new ports in order
to prevent low-level redundant constructions.

Thirdly, facilitate port clearance.

Port clearance, used to be an important way of

supervision over ships, is now becoming a service provided for shipowners by

11In recent years, the berthing capacity of Chinese coastal ports increasingly bottlenecks the upsizing trend of
ships and development of local maritime economies. Many ports resort to the “one ship, one case” principle to
receive ships of over their approved berthing sizes, which bring about great risk to operation safety and economic
burden to shipping companies and port operators.
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administrations. Efficient port clearance services will save time for shipowners and
enhance port competitiveness.

Recognizing the importance of ports to local

economy, administrations should take efforts to promote the facilitation of port
clearance by adopting advanced information technologies, such as the electronic
information exchange platforms and EDI platform, which will realize no paper
clearance and shorten ships time in port (Zhuang, 2001, p.49).

Fourthly, improve inland ports-linked transport system.

The cost advantages of

mega containerships are constrained by the C&D capability of ports, while the C&D
capabilities of ports are constrained by the linked inland transport system.
Administrations should coordinate the integration of inland transport system,
including rail, road and waterway transshipment, within ports C&D system to ensure
high efficiency of cargo flows between ships and shore. As the inland transport
system is for public welfare, administrations should play a leading role in the
construction and improvement of the system, though the involvement and
participation of shipping companies and port operators are very important.

Fifthly,

strengthen

supervision

and

emergency

response

capacities.

Administrations should not only see the benefits or economic growth brought by the
upsizing ships, but also pay attention to the safety concerns challenging crew, ship,
port and environment.

With the VLCSs and ULCSs being deployed in operation,

the safety concerns have been proved with sound ground by incidents or accidents
emerging now and then, caused by these gigantic carriers.

So administrations

should strengthen supervision over the safety operation of mega containerships and
ports accommodating them through modern technologies without causing much
inefficiency or barriers to the normal running of them.

Also, the original

emergency response capacities of administrations challenged by gigantic
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containerships are in need of updating and upgrading.

5.2.4 For International Maritime Community
International instruments drafted by International Maritime Community (IMC) are
becoming more and more compulsory, even mandatory if adopted and implemented
by sufficient member states, in regulating and guiding the development of global
shipping industry.

Ordering large-sized ships is the freedom of shipowners, but the pursuit for profit
will make them blind to risks. To ensure safe and sustainable development of the
international shipping industry, IMC, especially IMO, should closely observe and
guide the upsizing trend of containerships by formulating related standards/guidance
and implementing more safety-oriented measures. Besides the standards for ship’s
particulars and requirements for segregation and weight verification of containers as
mentioned in Chapter 4, the requirement for report container losses to IMO or other
international body is still lacking now, with approximately 675 containers lost at sea
every year (World Shipping Council, 2011, p.1), but no one can get the accurate
number.

Fortunately, international maritime community has realized the

importance of ensuring safer shipping in the process of upsizing ships, efforts have
been taken separately or jointly to ensure safety of ships.

5.2.5 For third party service providers
Third party service providers (TPSP), such as tugs, pilots, forwarders, cargo agencies,
booking agencies, etc., play an indispensable role in the upsizing development of
ships.

On one hand, their service efficiencies and capabilities will greatly influence

the time in port of mega ships; on the other hand, TPSPs will face fiercer competition
under the upsizing trend impacts, as for the same amount of cargos, less ships will be
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needed, thus fewer service providers needed.

Therefore, TPSPs should try to

improve service level and capability to cater for larger ships, which requires more
investment and resources.

Also TPSPs should learn strategies from shipowners and

port operators to cooperation with upper and lower segments of shipping chain, even
competitors if possible, to integrate resources and stay competitive in the market.
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Chapter 6 Conclusions

The paper restudies the upsizing trend of world containerships, aiming to provide

more comprehensive perspectives for the stakeholders within the industry.

Based

on the introduction and discussion of other five chapters, the main findings are
concluded as follows.

Firstly, the upsizing trend of containerships will continue but approach a new limit.
On one hand, the economies of scale, together with other drivers discussed in
Chapter 3, will encourage shipowners to order more large-sized ships to replace the
existing smaller ones

in order to cut costs, and the maximum size of containerships

will continue to grow with the rapid evolution of modern technologies towards more
fuel efficient and economies of scale.

On the other hand, the largest containership

is approaching the limit under present conditions.

Constraints of diseconomies of

scale, diseconomies of the transport system, accommodating capability of ports and
safety operation requirements, etc., will limit the further development of
containerships’ sizes.

But once the conditions change, the limit will be broken

again like the previous limits.

Secondly, shipowners should make strategic plan based on their individual conditions
to adapt to the upsizing trend.

Under the upsizing trend of containerships, the

container shipping industry has entered an ear of meager profit. Shipowners fall
into competitions for lower costs and survival with depressed freight rates.
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The

optimal composition differs for individual shipowners, so they should make plans
suitable for themselves and take appropriate measures to ensure best adaptation to
the upsizing trend.

Thirdly, port operators should well position their ports in the new Hub-Spoke
network of world container shipping. The readjustments of direct-calls of large
containerships bring port operators into fierce competitions and a retrofit to the world
container shipping network. During this process, many ports might be degraded to
feeders, so port operators should objectively and precisely locate their ports’
positions in the new Hub-Spoke network, and take appropriate strategies to avoiding
over investment and vicious competition.

Fourthly, national maritime authorities and international maritime communities
should closely supervise and actively guide the upsizing trend of containerships.

To

build any size of ship is the freedom of shipowners regardless of its economic utility
or fuel efficiency, but the risk of accidents and concerns for safety operations rise
with the increase of ships’ size.

To minimize weaknesses or possible negative

impacts of the large-sized ships, national maritime administrations and IMC, should
closely supervise and guide the upsizing trend of containerships by drafting and
issuing more safety-oriented standards or requirements.

The upsizing trend of containerships is not a new topic to study, but most of the
previous studies were limited to economic analysis, size optimization prediction or
limiting factors introduction.

As to the safety concerns, risk of diseconomies of

scale and the role of maritime administrations and IMC, they are seldom mentioned
or discussed, although they are crucial aspects of the upsizing trend.

The paper tries

to provide a comprehensive perspective of the upsizing trend of containerships by

51

introducing historic development, illustrating drivers and constraints, SWOT
analysing with abundant data from different sources, and put forward
recommendations for stakeholders.

Besides containerships, the upsizing trend is

common for almost all other types of world merchant ships, such as oil tank and bulk
carrier, also the large-sized ships of different types share similarities of strengths and
weaknesses. Therefore, the recommendations and conclusions are meaningful not
only for container sector, but also the whole shipping industry.
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